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Abstract 
We investigate the signalling effect related to participation in active labour market 
programmes. To this end, we conduct an experiment in which HR professionals make 
hiring decisions concerning fictitious job candidates who apply either under a job-vacancy 
referral system or directly. We provide first causal evidence for a substantial adverse effect 
of referral on the probability of being hired. In addition, we find that employers perceive 
referred candidates as being less motivated than other candidates.  
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1. Introduction 1 
In order to alter the trend of persistent unemployment over recent decades, the majority of OECD 2 
countries have invested vast amounts of public funds in active labour market policies (ALMPs; Martin, 3 
2014; Martin & Grubb, 2001). These investments have logically resulted in a surge in research 4 
evaluating the effectiveness of these policy instruments (Card et al., 2010, 2015; Greenberg et al., 2003; 5 
Heckman et al., 1999; Kluve, 2010; Liechti et al., 2017). The results of these evaluations are mixed at 6 
best. Overall, the effectiveness of ALMPs in terms of exit out of unemployment depends largely on the 7 
type of ALMP, its target group and the time horizon of the evaluation (Card et al., 2010, 2015; Kluve, 8 
2010; Martin & Grubb, 2001). Moreover, the few studies that have taken the costs of these 9 
programmes into account indicate that the benefits of ALMPs do not outweigh their costs (Albanese et 10 
al., 2016; Card et al., 2015; Crépon et al., 2013; Jespersen et al., 2008). The ALMP central to this study, 11 
a job-vacancy referral scheme implemented in Flanders, Belgium, exhibits the same mixed 12 
effectiveness. This scheme matches vacancies with jobseekers and, subsequently, forces jobseekers to 13 
apply for the vacancies matched to them.1 While some studies find positive results of this kind of 14 
programme with respect to exit out of unemployment (Bollens & Cockx, 2016; Fougère et al., 2009; 15 
van den Berg et al., 2014), others find no impact at all (Engström et al, 2012; van den Berg & van der 16 
Klaauw, 2006). Moreover, some of the studies that present positive effects of job-vacancy referrals 17 
show that the higher job-finding rate as a result of referral goes hand in hand with a lower job quality 18 
(van den Berg et al., 2016; van den Berg & Vikström, 2014).  19 
Measuring the effectiveness of these policies in terms of their desired outcomes is in no doubt 20 
important. However, if one aims to reform ALMPs to increase their effectiveness, one needs to go 21 
beyond measuring and look at possible explanations for the unsatisfactory effectiveness. One possible 22 
explanation documented in the literature is the signal associated with ALMPs. Signalling theory states 23 
that when individuals are faced with limited information, they will use particular components of this 24 
3 
information to predict unobserved factors (Arrow, 1973; Blanchard & Diamond, 1994; Moscarini, 1977; 1 
Spence, 1973; Vishwanath, 1983). In this respect, we can expect a positive as well as a negative signal 2 
sent to prospective employers by a job-vacancy referral.2 On the one hand, candidates applying for a 3 
position at the request of a public employment service (PES) have gone through an initial screening 4 
process and have been deemed suitable for the position by the PES. In other words, the vacancy referral 5 
could be seen as a signal of improved suitability (Bellis et al., 2011). On the other hand, employers could 6 
see referred applicants as candidates who do not have the ability to succeed in the labour market on 7 
their own and/or only apply to comply with benefit rules (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010; Bellis et al., 2011; 8 
Ingold & Stuart, 2014). As a consequence, being referred to a vacancy has been theoretically related to 9 
lower intellectual and/or social abilities (Bellis et al., 2011; Ingold & Stuart, 2014), lower trainability 10 
(Thurow, 1975), negative evaluation by previous employers (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992) 11 
and, most commonly cited, lower motivation (Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010; Ingold & Stuart, 2014).  12 
The empirical literature on the signal of ALMPs is limited and mainly of a qualitative nature (Bellis 13 
et al., 2011; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 2010; Ingold & Stuart, 2014; Liechti et al., 2017). Little or no causal 14 
evidence has been presented for signalling as an explanation for the limited effectiveness of these 15 
policies. Falk et al. (2005) and Liechti et al. (2017) are notable exceptions. By means of a field 16 
experiment, Falk et al. (2005) measure how completing a computer training programme impacts job-17 
finding rates. More concretely, they compare the call-back rates for job candidates with and without 18 
this kind of training. They find that completing a computer training programme does not yield higher 19 
call-back rates. Liechti et al. (2017) quantify the signalling value of different types of ALMPs, including 20 
training programmes and subsidised employment, by means of a factorial survey experiment. They find 21 
that employers do take ALMP participation into account when making hiring decisions, but the 22 
signalling effect of this participation can be both positive as well as negative, depending on the 23 
potential candidate’s distance from the labour market.  24 
In this study, we investigate the signalling value of a distinct type of ALMP: a job-vacancy referral. 25 
4 
To this aim, we conduct a state-of-the-art vignette experiment with human resource (HR) professionals. 1 
We ask these participants to make fictitious hiring decisions concerning job candidates described on 2 
vignettes. Half of these candidates are indicated as applying under a job-vacancy referral scheme. 3 
Besides being rated in terms of hireability, these fictitious candidates are evaluated on statements 4 
related to the five potential signals sent by applying in the context of a referral as listed above 5 
(motivation, intellectual abilities, social abilities, trainability, and previous unfavourable evaluation by 6 
other employers). The data collected by means of this experiment allow us to answer three research 7 
questions.  8 
R1: Does applying for a job under a job-vacancy referral scheme yield lower hiring chances?  9 
R2: Is the signalling effect of applying for a job under a vacancy referral scheme heterogeneous by 10 
candidate and participant characteristics?  11 
R3: Which particular signals are sent by applying for a job under a vacancy referral scheme? 12 
The present study complements the work by Falk et al. (2005) and Liechti et al. (2017) by quantifying 13 
the signalling value of a different type of ALMP. In addition, by means of answering R3, we contribute 14 
to this literature by being the first to investigate which signal(s) is (are) particularly sent by participation 15 
in ALMPs in general and applying under a vacancy referral scheme in particular. This is of particular 16 
policy relevance because it shows which prejudices against the unemployed applying for jobs under a 17 
job-vacancy referral scheme should be compensated for. 18 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting, 19 
our experimental design, and the realised data collection. Our research questions are answered in 20 
Section 3, where results from analysis of the experimental data are presented. Section 4 concludes, 21 
focussing on both the academic and policy implications of our research. 22 
5 
2. Experiment 1 
To answer R1, R2, and R3, we conducted a vignette experiment. In this kind of experiment, participants 2 
are asked to judge fictitious descriptions (presented on vignettes) that differ on a pre-defined number 3 
of variables (the vignette factors), which are randomly assigned a value (the vignette-levels; Auspurg & 4 
Hinz, 2014; Jasso, 2006; Rossi & Nock, 1982; Sauer et al., 2011). As a consequence of these design 5 
features, correlation between the vignette factors are minimised to a value close to 0 (Rossi & Nock, 6 
1982), a situation which rarely occurs outside an experimental setting. The biggest advantage of 7 
vignette experiments is, therefore, that they enable scholars to give a causal interpretation to the 8 
measured effects of the included vignette factors on human decisions (Damelang & Abraham, 2016; 9 
Wallander, 2009). Moreover, as opposed to field experiments, vignette experiments have the added 10 
benefit of creating the opportunity to ask additional questions to unravel the thinking process behind 11 
certain decisions and, consequently, to shed light on why we observe certain phenomena. 12 
Vignette experiments have recently been the method of choice for a number of prominent studies 13 
in sociology and economics investigating human judgement (Ambuehl & Ockenfels, 2017; Auspurg et 14 
al., 2017; Eriksson & Kristensen, 2014; Mathew, 2017; Rivera & Tilcsik, 2016). In particular, this type of 15 
experiment has been increasingly used to study dynamics in hiring decisions (Auer et al., 2016; 16 
Damelang & Abraham, 2016; Di Stasio, 2014; Di Stasio & Van de Werfhorst, 2016; Liechti et al., 2017; 17 
McDonald, 2017; Van Belle et al., 2018; Van Hoye & Lievens, 2003). In this application of the vignette 18 
experimentation framework, participants have to judge fictitious candidates with divergent 19 
characteristics as vignette factors. As a consequence, these vignette experiments closely mimic real-20 
life hiring situations, where HR professionals also take a number of characteristics into account when 21 
making hiring decisions. In our application, we included as a vignette factor whether job candidates 22 
applied to this vacancy under a job-vacancy referral system or on their own initiative. Exogenous 23 
variation in this factor would be hard to find in observational data.  24 
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Regardless of these marked advantages, the chosen experimental approach has some limitations, 1 
which we should acknowledge. Firstly, contrary to field experiments, the data collection within a 2 
vignette experiment does not take place under real-life circumstances, and participants are aware that 3 
they are taking part in an experiment. This creates the risk of participants answering in a socially 4 
desirable way. However, we believe this to be less of a concern in our vignette experiment for a number 5 
of reasons. An important feature of a vignette experiment is that each participant is shown only a small 6 
number of vignettes, and these vary on a number of factors. Therefore, it is very difficult for the 7 
participant to ascertain the socially desirable answer (Auspurg et al., 2014; Liechti et al., 2017; Mutz, 8 
2011). Vignette experiments have been able to identify unequal treatment, even when used to 9 
investigate socially sensitive topics such as unequal treatment based on gender and race (Auspurg & 10 
Hinz, 2014). Moreover, if we did record some socially desirable answers in our experiment, the results 11 
described in this study could be seen as a lower bound of the true effects.3 Secondly, we only measure 12 
the effect of referral on hiring for individuals with a specific profile applying for a specific position. As a 13 
consequence, we cannot say to what extent our results are generalizable to settings with different jobs 14 
and candidate profiles (see also Van Belle et al., 2018). 15 
The next subsections describe the specific institutional framework under study, the design of our 16 
vignettes, and the data gathering process.  17 
2.1. Institutional Framework  18 
Our study focusses on a job-vacancy referral scheme implemented by the PES of Flanders, the northern 19 
part of Belgium. In essence, this scheme matches open vacancies with jobseekers and, subsequently, 20 
forces jobseekers to apply for the vacancies matched to them. There are two types of possible referrals. 21 
In the case of a classic referral, a case worker, possibly aided by matching software, matches an open 22 
vacancy with an unemployed benefit recipient, who is then obliged to apply for it. In the alternative 23 
type of referral, the caseworker invites the unemployed person for a meeting, during which they go 24 
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over a set of potentially relevant vacancies. If the unemployed person and the caseworker agree that 1 
a particular vacancy suits the person’s profile, (s)he is obliged to apply. In both cases, non-compliance 2 
with the referral may result in a reduction or loss of benefits. In the context of monitoring this 3 
compliance, the PES informs the employer about the referral. This happens at, or soon after, the time 4 
of referral.4 So, in principle, the employer is aware that a candidate is referred by the PES prior to this 5 
candidate’s actual job application.5  6 
As a consequence, the policy under study consists of two components. Firstly, registered job 7 
seekers are matched with open vacancies, either electronically or by a case worker. Secondly, the job 8 
seeker is obliged to apply for the vacancy and will be sanctioned in the case of non-compliance. Both 9 
components of this intervention may have consequences on the demand- and supply-side of the labour 10 
market, which could be either positive or negative. At the supply side, the job seeker is incentivized to 11 
apply for more vacancies. Indeed, the job seeker is obliged to apply for matched vacancies. Moreover, 12 
as the job seeker becomes aware of the increased surveillance, he or she might apply for other 13 
vacancies to avoid future job referrals. On the demand-side, we can expect two opposing effects. First, 14 
because of the matching component, the referred candidates should be a better match for the vacancy 15 
than the average job candidate. This increased match quality could be either directly observable, or 16 
unobservable to prospective employers. In the second case, being matched to a vacancy by the PES 17 
might still send a positive signal of match quality to employers. On the other hand, the fact that the job 18 
seeker is obliged to apply for the vacancy might send the opposite signal to employers, namely that the 19 
job seeker merely applies to avoid being sanctioned.  20 
Bollens and Cockx (2016) used a timing-of-events approach to investigate the effectiveness of this 21 
job-vacancy referral scheme in terms of entry to employment. They measured the total effect of the 22 
scheme, being the resultant of all supply- and demand-side factors of both components (i.e. the 23 
matching and the obligation component). They report substantial positive treatment effects both 24 
during the month of the referral and over the course of the following months. However, as this positive 25 
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total effect of the referral measured by Bollens and Cockx (2016) combines supply-side and demand-1 
side effects, it remains interesting to unravel the underlying dynamics. Moreover, at the time of the 2 
evaluation performed by Bollens and Cockx (2016), employers were informed about the referral in 3 
approximately only 25% of the cases, so that demand-side dynamics might have been less influential 4 
at that time. 5 
In the present study, we focus on the demand-side effects of the job-vacancy referral scheme, and 6 
more precisely, on the signals related to applying for a vacancy through this programme. The 7 
observable characteristics of our fictitious job candidates are orthogonal to their referral status (see 8 
below). Consequently, a potential signal of a better match quality only concerns characteristics 9 
unobservable from a résumé and might therefore be quantitatively less important in our setting. As a 10 
result, we mainly estimate the signal of being obliged to apply for a matching vacancy. 11 
2.2. Vignette Design 12 
We asked a sample of HR professionals described in the subsection below to evaluate a set of five 13 
vignettes, each describing one potential fictitious candidate for an open vacancy. These job applicants 14 
differed in the six vignette factors defined in Table 1. The main factor of interest was the one indicating 15 
whether or not candidates were referred to the position by the PES.6 More precisely, and in line with 16 
reality, candidate summaries could either mention that the candidate applied for the position directly 17 
or was referred by the PES. In the latter case, it was mentioned explicitly that this entailed that the 18 
candidate was obliged to apply for this suitable vacancy. Besides this factor, applicants differed in 19 
gender (male or female), educational attainment (secondary education certificate or bachelor’s 20 
degree), previous work experience (two or five years), whether they mentioned social activities (none 21 
or volunteering activities), and unemployment duration prior to the application (1 to 36 months). These 22 
vignette factors were chosen on the basis of a literature review of drivers of job-application success 23 
(Damelang & Abraham, 2016; Di Stasio, 2014; Di Stasio & Van de Werfhorst, 2016; Liechti et al., 2017; 24 
9 
Van Belle et al., 2018) and an interview with three HR professionals.7 In addition, we ran a pilot study 1 
with 30 master’s students in Economics to test whether our vignettes were perceived as plausible and 2 
that no crucial information was omitted.  3 
< Table 1 about here > 4 
After fully crossing all vignette levels for the six mentioned factors, we obtained a vignette universe 5 
of 1,152 (i.e. 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 36) vignettes. We used a D-efficient randomisation to minimise 6 
correlation between the different vignette factors. More concretely, following the algorithm in Auspurg 7 
and Hinz (2014), we selected 60 sets of 5 vignettes, allowing us to achieve a D-efficiency of 99.809.8 8 
Each participant was randomly assigned one of these 60 sets. The resulting correlations between our 9 
vignette factors can be found in Table A1 (in Appendix A) and show that our randomisation approach 10 
was successful.  11 
2.3.  Data Collection 12 
We conducted our experiment in January 2017 with Flemish recruiters. The experiment was part of a 13 
large-scale survey performed with individuals that selected themselves in a database of volunteers for 14 
participation in research on human resource management. At the start of this survey, the participants 15 
were asked whether they had been actively involved in the hiring process a minimum of five times 16 
during the past year. Participants who answered this question in a positive way had a 50% probability 17 
of being assigned to our experiment (and a 50% probability of being assigned to the experiment of Van 18 
Belle et al. (2018)). In total, 234 recruiters took part in our experiment. Of these respondents, 29 left 19 
one or more questions unanswered, leaving us with a total sample of 205 participants. Each participant 20 
rated five vignettes, yielding a total of 1,025 at the participant-vignette level.9  21 
As a first step, each participant received experimental instructions. They were introduced to their 22 
role as a recruiter for a fictitious company supplying building materials. In this role, they were 23 
10 
responsible for filling an open vacancy for a new counter assistant—we selected this occupation 1 
because it is common in a number of industries, thus increasing the probability that participants would 2 
be familiar with it. Participants were informed that the successful candidate had to be (i) customer 3 
orientated, (ii) service minded, and (iii) commercially orientated. Moreover, the company was looking 4 
for someone able to perform administrative tasks in an efficient and reliable way. No specific education 5 
or work experience was required. Subsequently, each participant was shown five vignettes (as 6 
described in the previous section). It was stressed that all five candidates had passed an initial screening 7 
by an administrative staff member. In line with the literature, the applicants’ characteristics were 8 
presented in a tabulated way. Participants, though aware of participating in an experiment, were not 9 
informed of the goal or the topic of the experiment, which was framed in rather general terms. 10 
With this information at hand, participants were asked to reveal, for each candidate, their hiring 11 
intentions. They were specifically asked to rate the statements ‘The probability that I will invite this 12 
candidate for a job interview is high’ and ‘The probability that I will hire this candidate for the position 13 
is high’ on a 7-point Likert scale. In the remainder of this article, these scales will be referred to as the 14 
‘interview scale’ and the ‘hiring scale’, respectively. 15 
In addition, in view of answering R3, participants were prompted to rate five statements (also on a 16 
7-point Likert scale) linked to the different signals that could be sent by a job-vacancy referral prevalent 17 
in the literature and as described in Section 1. So, perceptions concerning the candidates’ (i) 18 
motivation, (ii) intellectual abilities, (iii) social abilities, (iv) trainability, and (v) previous unfavourable 19 
evaluation by other employers were tested. The statements used can be found in Table A2. We limited 20 
the experimental survey to one statement per signal to keep the overall time taken up by the 21 
experiment within a reasonable limit (taking into account that each respondent was asked to review 22 
multiple profiles).  23 
Finally, in view of answering R2, some personal characteristics of the respondents were surveyed, 24 
including their gender, age, nationality, educational attainment, frequency of hiring, and experience 25 
11 
with the hiring process. 1 
Panel A of Table 2 presents some summary statistics concerning the participants in our experiment. 2 
Participants had an average age of about 43 years, with most being Belgian nationals and having some 3 
form of tertiary education. They were slightly more likely to be female than male. A total of 46.8% of 4 
the respondents indicated that they recruited someone on at least a weekly basis, while 55.1% 5 
indicated having at least ten years’ experience as a recruiter.  6 
< Table 2 about here > 7 
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 the research sample is split by the referral status of the judged job 8 
candidate. Column (4) presents the difference between these two columns as well as the results of a t-9 
test to determine whether these differences are statistically significant. Given that each respondent 10 
judged five candidate profiles, our data are inherently nested. We control for this by clustering at the 11 
participant level. Overall, the information in Panel A of Table 2 allows us to conclude that referral status 12 
was successfully randomised over the participants. 13 
3. Results 14 
3.1. Does Applying for a Job Under a Job Referral Scheme Yield Lower Hiring 15 
Chances? 16 
A first indication of the signalling effect of applying for a job under a job-vacancy referral scheme is 17 
given in Figure 1. On the left-hand side, the average rating on the interview and hiring scales by referral 18 
status is depicted. It is clear that candidates referred to the vacancy by the PES are both less likely to 19 
be invited for an interview (p = 0.000) and less likely to be hired (p = 0.000) for the position. The average 20 
rating on the interview (hiring) scale is 0.657 (0.643) lower for referred candidates than for direct 21 
12 
applicants. In other words, given that the standard deviation of the interview (hiring) scale is 1.608 1 
(1.414), being referred to the vacancy decreases the probability of an interview (getting hired) by 40.9% 2 
(45.5%) of a standard deviation. The same information can be inferred from Panel B of Table 2. 3 
< Figure 1 about here > 4 
Due to our experimental set-up—the referral dummy is, by design, uncorrelated with any of the 5 
other observable candidate characteristics—these effects can be given a causal interpretation. In 6 
addition, due to the random allocation of vignette sets to participants, we do not expect any correlation 7 
with the participant characteristics. This is also confirmed when we estimate the following econometric 8 
model: 9 
𝑌 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾𝑃𝐶 + 𝛿𝑅𝐸𝐹 + 𝜀.       (1) 10 
In this model, 𝑅𝐸𝐹 is the candidate’s referral status (1 in case of referral, 0 in case of direct application); 11 
𝐶𝐶 is the vector of the other vignette factors mentioned in Subsection 2.2; and 𝑃𝐶 is the vector of 12 
participant characteristics mentioned in the same subsection. The dependent variable of this model, 13 
𝑌, can be either the interview or hiring scale. 𝛽, 𝛾, and 𝛿 are the (vectors of) parameters associated 14 
with 𝐶𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶 , and 𝑅𝐸𝐹  and 𝛼  represents the intercept in this equation. Finally, standard error 𝜀 is 15 
corrected for clustering of the observations at the participant level. 16 
The estimation results of this model are reported in column (1) of Table 3 and Table A3, with the 17 
interview and hiring scales as respective outcomes. Again, in Panel A of this table, we observe that 18 
candidates who are referred to the position by the PES are less likely to be invited for an interview—19 
the related coefficient is substantial in both economic and statistical terms. This clearly indicates that 20 
being referred to a position by the PES—and, in particular, being obliged to apply for this position—has 21 
a negative signalling effect for the employers. This finding corroborates the qualitative evidence on the 22 
signalling effect of ALMP participation mentioned in Section 1 (Bellis et al., 2011; Bonoli & Hinrichs, 23 
2010; Ingold & Stuart, 2014). Moreover, the negative signal of a job-vacancy referral could be part of 24 
13 
the explanation for the unsatisfactory results of these programmes in terms of employment outcomes. 1 
Finally, our finding indicates that the positive effect of the Flemish referral system on employment 2 
outcomes, as found in Bollens and Cockx (2016), could be even larger if this adverse signalling effect 3 
could be reduced. We return to this point in Section 4. 4 
< Table 3 about here > 5 
Concerning the other vignette factors, the estimated coefficients all have the expected signs. While 6 
gender has no effect on the likelihood of being invited for an interview, having a bachelor’s degree (as 7 
opposed to a secondary-level education) and having five (as opposed to two) years’ professional 8 
experience clearly enhances one’s chances of being invited, as does mentioning volunteering 9 
activities.10 On the other hand, in line with what was found by Van Belle et al. (2018), the longer a 10 
candidate has been unemployed prior to the position, the lower her/his chances of being invited for an 11 
interview. If we turn to the coefficients related to the participant characteristics (in Panel B of Table 3), 12 
we see that female and older recruiters are more lenient in their judgement, while recruiters who are 13 
involved in the hiring process at least once a week tend to be stricter.  14 
The corresponding estimation results when adopting the hiring scale as the outcome variable 15 
(Table A3, column (1)) are largely in line with the discussed results when using the interview scale as 16 
the dependent variable. However, the significant effect of recruiter gender disappears. 17 
3.2. Is this Effect Heterogeneous by Candidate and Subject Characteristics? 18 
To determine whether the signalling effect of the job-vacancy referral depends on other candidate 19 
characteristics, we re-estimate equation (1) including interaction terms between the referral dummy 20 
and each of the five other vignette factors. After including these interactions, the remaining coefficient 21 
of the referral dummy should be interpreted as the effect of a referral for a reference candidate, i.e. a 22 
male candidate with high school certification and two years’ experience who has been unemployed for 23 
14 
zero months and did not mention any social activities on his CV. The results of this exercise are reported 1 
in column (2) of Table 3 and Table A3. We find that the signalling value of the job-vacancy referral 2 
scheme is not moderated by any of the other candidate characteristics. In particular, it is interesting to 3 
note that the negative effect of a PES referral does not vary with the length of the unemployment spell. 4 
Had we observed such an interaction effect, this could have been interpreted as suggestive evidence 5 
of employers assuming that the long-term unemployed simply apply via the PES to keep receiving 6 
benefits (without being intrinsically motivated to fill the vacancy).  7 
Secondly, in column (3) of Table 3 and Table A3 we present the results of a similar analysis to study 8 
whether the effect of the job-vacancy referral is heterogeneous by type of recruiter. More concretely, 9 
compared to column (1), interaction terms between referral and the participant characteristics are 10 
adopted. In contrast to the candidate characteristics, the observed participant characteristics are not 11 
experimentally controlled and can, as a consequence, correlate with unobserved participant traits. 12 
Thus, the interaction effects presented in column (3) cannot be given a causal interpretation. However, 13 
we find that the effect of being referred to a vacancy is not heterogeneous by any of the participant 14 
characteristics. 15 
3.3. Which Signals Are Sent by Applying for a Job Under a Job Referral Scheme? 16 
In this subsection, we explore what exactly is signalled by the job-vacancy referral scheme, thereby 17 
examining why applying via a referral decreases one’s hiring chances. The right-hand side of Figure 1 18 
(and Panel C of Table 2) gives us a first indication of the empirical importance of the possible signals 19 
put forward in the literature and enumerated in Section 1. It is revealed that the candidates who apply 20 
for the open vacancy directly, without action or obligation by the PES, score better, on average, on all 21 
five statements related to these signals than those candidates who have been referred to the vacancy 22 
by the PES. So, referred candidates are, indeed, perceived as less motivated, less intellectually gifted, 23 
less socially gifted and less trainable, as well as having been rejected more often by other employers. 24 
15 
These perceptions are statistically significant (at the 1% level), with the exception of the last one. In 1 
terms of economic significance, it is striking that the effect of referral on perceived motivation of the 2 
candidate is substantially higher than its effect on the other perception scales. 3 
Finally, we estimate a mediation model, where these five potential signals related to referral are 4 
included jointly. This has two important advantages. Firstly, we can estimate the prominence of each 5 
signal independently. This is important as the signals potentially correlate with each other.11 Secondly, 6 
in addition to looking at the impact of the referral on the signals, the model takes the importance of 7 
the signals in terms of invitation (or hiring) probability into account as well. This enables us to look at 8 
what part of the total effect of the referral on hiring is explained by each signal. The estimated model 9 
consists of the following system of equations (in line with Hayes (2013) and Van Belle et al. (2018)): 10 
𝑀𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾𝑖𝑃𝐶 + 𝛿𝑖𝑅𝐸𝐹 + 𝜀𝑖;     (2) 11 
𝑌 =  𝛼′ + 𝛽′𝐶𝐶 + 𝛾′𝑃𝐶 + 𝛿′𝑅𝐸𝐹 + 𝜃𝑀 + 𝜀′.    (3) 12 
In this system, 𝐶𝐶, 𝑃𝐶, 𝑅𝐸𝐹, and 𝑌 are the same variables as those defined in the context of equation 13 
(1). In addition, 𝑀 is the vector of mediators capturing perceived motivation, intellectual abilities, social 14 
abilities, trainability, and evaluation by other employers, respectively. 𝛽𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, and 𝛿𝑖  are the (vectors of) 15 
parameters associated with 𝐶𝐶, 𝑃𝐶, and 𝑅𝐸𝐹 in the equations with 𝑀𝑖 as a dependent variable, and 16 
𝛼𝑖 represents the intercept in these equations. 𝛽’, 𝛾’, δ′, and 𝛼’ are the corresponding parameters in 17 
the equation with 𝑌 as a dependent variable. Finally, 𝜃 is the vector parameters associated with the 18 
mediating signals in the latter equation. As a consequence, 𝛿′ is the remaining direct effect of the 19 
referral after controlling for the five mediators. The products 𝛿𝑖𝜃𝑖 are the indirect effects of the referral 20 
on 𝑌 through each mediator 𝑀𝑖. In line with Hayes (2013), we estimate this system of six equations 21 
simultaneously and, as before, correct the standard errors 𝜀𝑖  and 𝜀′ for clustering of the observations 22 
at the participant level. 23 
The main results of this analysis with the interview scale (hiring scale) as the outcome are reported 24 
16 
in Figure 2 (Figure A1). The corresponding full estimation results are reported in Table 4 (Table A4). Just 1 
as was the case with the overall signalling effect discussed in Section 3.1, the effect of the referral on 2 
each of the five perceptions concerning the candidate (i.e. the 𝛿𝑖  in our model) can be interpreted as 3 
causal effects as a consequence of the random assignment of a referral to the vignettes. In contrast, 4 
the effect of these perceptions on the interview (and hiring) scale (i.e. the 𝜃𝑖 in our model) cannot be 5 
given a causal interpretation as the included mediators could correlate with other, unobserved, signals 6 
related to applying under a job-vacancy referral system. As a consequence, also the mediation effects 7 
𝛿𝑖𝜃𝑖 should be seen as associations rather than as causal effects.  8 
< Figure 2 about here > 9 
< Table 4 about here > 10 
The left-hand side of Figure 2 shows the effect of the referral on each of the five mediators. Even 11 
after controlling for the other mediators, candidates with a referral are perceived as being less 12 
motivated, possessing less intellectual and social abilities, and being less trainable. Again, the impact 13 
of a referral on perceived motivation is substantially larger than its impact on any of the other potential 14 
signals. Finally, being referred to the vacancy does not have any effect on the perceived evaluation by 15 
other employers, both in statistical and economic terms.  16 
The right-hand side of Figure 2 reports the effect of the different signals on the likelihood of being 17 
invited for a job interview. We find that having higher perceived motivation, higher perceived 18 
intellectual or social abilities, and a better perceived evaluation by other employers all significantly 19 
enhance one’s chances of being invited for a job interview. In contrast with what is expected based on 20 
queuing theory (Thurow, 1975), we find that perceived trainability does not have any impact on the 21 
probability of being invited for a job interview. 22 
By multiplying the left- and right-hand sides of this figure, we can decompose the total effect of a 23 
referral on the likelihood of being invited for a job interview (𝛿 = −0.655; p = 0.000) found in Subsection 24 
17 
3.1 into a remaining direct effect and indirect effects via perceptions concerning the candidate’s 1 
motivation, intellectual ability, social ability, trainability, and evaluation by other employers. We find a 2 
substantial mediation effect related to perceived motivation (𝛿1𝜃1= −0.492; p = 0.000): 75.1% (i.e. 3 
−0.492/−0.655) of the total effect of a referral on the interview probability is explained by this referral 4 
constituting a negative signal of motivation. Additionally, being referred to a vacancy also constitutes 5 
a signal of fewer intellectual (𝛿2𝜃2= −0.042; p = 0.010) and social (𝛿3𝜃3= −0.027; p = 0.043) abilities. 6 
However, these coefficients are very small compared to the mediation effect related to perceived 7 
motivation. The measured direct effect (𝛿′= −0.090; p = 0.235) is the part of the total effect that 8 
remains unexplained by the inclusion of the mediators. Given that this direct effect is not significantly 9 
different from zero, we can infer that the signals included in our mediation model fully explain the 10 
effect of a referral on interview chances. The quarter of the negative signal that is not explained by a 11 
perceived lower motivation could be dominated by other elements of the vacancy referral scheme that 12 
are less important in our experimental design, for example the perceived match quality of the 13 
candidate and the job.  14 
These findings corroborate the evidence from qualitative research suggesting that referral is seen 15 
as a signal of lower motivation (Bellis et al., 2011; Ingold & Stuart, 2014). They seem to indicate that 16 
employers do view the candidates who are obliged to apply by the PES as candidates who mainly apply 17 
in order to continue receiving benefits, which contrasts with the insignificant interaction effect 18 
between referral and unemployment duration, as elaborated on in Subsection 3.2.  19 
The results of the mediation analysis with the probability of being hired for the position as the 20 
outcome variable are largely similar to the results with the probability of a job interview as the outcome 21 
variable. An alternative representation of these mediation results, in the sense of Heckman et al. 22 
(2013), is given in Table A5. 23 
18 
4. Conclusion 1 
This article contributed to the literature on the effectiveness of active labour market policies. As 2 
argued, the evaluation literature has mainly focused on measuring the overall effectiveness of these 3 
programmes, with mixed results. Therefore, in our opinion, the logical next step to take in this literature 4 
is to explain why this unsatisfactory effectiveness exists. In this study, we investigated the signalling 5 
effect of applying for a job through a vacancy referral scheme, thereby focussing on demand-side 6 
dynamics. As the job-vacancy referral scheme may also have supply-side effects, as reviewed in 7 
Subsection 2.1, future research could look into these supply-side dynamics and, especially, the added 8 
value of the matching component of the referral scheme in this perspective.  9 
Based on a vignette experiment with HR professionals, we provided first causal evidence for a large 10 
negative effect of being referred on one’s probability of getting invited to a job interview and finally 11 
getting the job. In addition, our experimental design allowed us to explore what exactly is signalled by 12 
a job-vacancy referral, testing five potential signals documented in the literature: lower motivation, 13 
lower intellectual abilities, lower social abilities, lower trainability, and poor evaluation by other 14 
employers. The single most important explanation appeared to be that candidates applying for a 15 
position after a PES referral were perceived as significantly less motivated. This corroborates earlier 16 
qualitative findings by Bonoli and Hinrichs (2010), Bellis et al. (2011), and Ingold and Stuart (2014).  17 
Besides their academic relevance, our results have substantial policy implications. Our findings are 18 
consistent with two possible scenarios. Either referred candidates are indeed less motivated or the 19 
referred candidates are, in reality, at least on average, not less motivated than other candidates. In the 20 
first situation, it is important to know whether those referred are intrinsically less motivated or whether 21 
it is the referral which causes the lower motivation. If those referred are intrinsically less motivated, 22 
the PES should link the referrals to other policies to increase the benefit recipient’s motivation. If it is 23 
the referral that is lowering the benefit recipient’s motivation, one might question the usefulness of 24 
19 
the referral scheme. If, on the other hand, the second scenario is the true scenario, it is important to 1 
reverse the negative perception of referred applicants. We see two ways of doing this. One way would 2 
be simply not to inform employers of the referral status of applicants. As aforementioned, at the time 3 
of Bollens and Cockx’s (2016) study, the employer was only informed of a candidate being referred by 4 
the PES in approximately 25% of the cases. As they found a large positive effect of the referral on job-5 
finding probabilities, this suggests that not informing employers about a referral could indeed mitigate 6 
the negative effect on hiring probabilities. However, if the unemployed person is aware that the 7 
employer is not informed about the existence of the referral, and consequently, the PES cannot 8 
effectively monitor compliance, this might lower the overall effectiveness of the referral as there will 9 
no longer be a threat effect. Another way would entail the PES informing employers better that the 10 
referred candidates have gone through an initial screening (by the PES) and should therefore be a 11 
better match to the vacancy than other candidates. Overall, our findings suggest that there is room for 12 
improvement in the implementation of the vacancy referral scheme in Flanders.  13 
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Figure 1. 
Differences in Average Ratings by Referral Status of the Candidate 
 
Note. More information concerning the used scales can be found in Subsection 2.3. T-tests are performed to test whether the presented differences are significantly different from 0. Standard 








































Mediation Model with Interview Scale as Outcome 
 
Note. The presented statistics are coefficient estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) for the mediation model outlined in Subsection 3.3. 𝛿 stands for the total effect, 𝛿’ for the direct 
effect, and 𝛿𝑖𝜃𝑖  for the indirect effects of a referral on the likelihood of an interview invitation passing through mediator 𝑀𝑖. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the 
participant level. The confidence intervals for the mediation effects are based on 10,000 bootstrap samples. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 1. 
Vignette Factors and Levels 
Vignette factors Vignette levels 
Gender {Male, Female} 
Highest obtained educational certification {Secondary education, Bachelor’s degree} 
Previous work experience {Two years’ experience, Five years’ experience} 
Mentioned social activities {None, Volunteering} 
Unemployment duration {1 month, 2 months, …, 36 months} 
Referral {Referred by the PES, Direct application} 
Note. PES stands for the Public Employment Service (of Flanders). The factorial product of the vignette levels (2 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 
36 × 2) resulted in 1,152 possible combinations. Sets of five vignettes were drawn from this vignette universe using a D-efficient 
design (D-efficiency: 99.809; Auspurg & Hinz, 2014) and distributed at random to the participants as described in Subsection 





Summary Statistics by Referral Status of the Candidate 
  Mean   
 Full sample 
Subsample: 
Referral 
Subsample:         
No referral 
Difference: 
(3) – (2) 
 N = 1,025 N = 521 N = 504  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS     
Female gender 0.566 0.564 0.567 −0.003 [0.228] 
Age 43.024 43.177 42.867 0.310 [0.966] 
Foreign nationality 0.093 0.094 0.091 0.003 [0.345] 
Highest obtained educational certification     
    Secondary education or lower 0.093 0.100 0.085 0.014* [1.860] 
    Tertiary education: outside university 0.429 0.436 0.423 0.013 [0.950] 
    Tertiary education: university 0.478 0.464 0.492 −0.028** [1.993] 
Frequency of hiring: weekly 0.468 0.468 0.468 0.001 [0.005] 
Experience as HR professional: ≥ 10 years 0.551 0.559 0.544 0.015 [1.074] 
B. EVALUATION: INTERVIEW AND HIRING DECISIONS     
Interview scale 4.329 4.006 4.663 −0.657*** [6.548] 
Hiring scale 3.739 3.422 4.065 −0.643*** [7.324] 
C. EVALUATION: PERCEIVED CANDIDATE TRAITS     
Perceived motivation 4.115 3.635 4.611 −0.976*** [11.736] 
Perceived intellectual abilities 4.774 4.678 4.873 −0.195*** [3.054] 
Perceived social abilities 4.386 4.290 4.861 −0.196*** [3.173] 
Perceived trainability 4.433 4.288 4.583 −0.295*** [4.649] 
Perceived evaluation by other employers 3.629 3.582 3.679 −0.097 [1.207] 
Note. More information concerning the scales mentioned in Panel B and Panel C can be found in Subsection 2.3. T-tests are 
performed to test whether the presented differences are significantly different from 0. Standard errors are corrected for 
clustering of the observations at the participant level. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance 
level. T-statistics are between brackets.
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Table 3. 
Multivariate Analysis: Regression Analysis with Interview Scale as Outcome 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS    
Female gender 0.075 (0.074) 0.036 (0.117) 0.083 (0.074) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.344*** (0.083) 0.385*** (0.123) 0.356*** (0.083) 
Five years’ experience 0.265*** (0.080) 0.360*** (0.111) 0.264*** (0.079) 
Unemployment duration −0.053*** (0.004) −0.057*** (0.005) −0.053*** (0.004) 
Volunteering 0.356*** (0.067) 0.388*** (0.108) 0.360*** (0.068) 
Referral −0.655*** (0.090) −0.690*** (0.260) −0.590*** (0.500) 
Referral × Female gender  0.067 (0.179)  
Referral × Bachelor’s degree  −0.096 (0.176)  
Referral × Five years’ experience  −0.185 (0.187)  
Referral × Unemployment spell  0.009 (0.007)  
Referral × Volunteering  −0.048 (0.169)  
B. PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS    
Female gender 0.341** (0.161) 0.344** (0.161) 0.363** (0.167) 
Age 0.027*** (0.009) 0.027*** (0.009) 0.018* (0.010) 
Highest obtained educational certification    
    Secondary education or lower 0.005 (0.269) −0.002 (0.270) −0.216 (0.319) 
    Tertiary education: outside university 0.074 (0.147) 0.067 (0.148) 0.119 (0.164) 
    Tertiary education: university (reference)    
Frequency of hiring: weekly −0.393** (0.168) −0.391** (0.168) −0.460** (0.191) 
Experience as HR professional: ≥ 10 years −0.239 (0.177) −0.240 (0.178) −0.153 (0.198) 
Referral × Female gender   −0.044 (0.177) 
Referral × Age   0.017 (0.011) 
Referral × Secondary education or lower   0.405 (0.305) 
Referral × Tertiary education: outside university   −0.077 (0.187) 
Referral × Frequency of hiring: weekly   0.120 (0.183) 
Referral × Experience as HR professional: ≥ 10 years   −0.182 (0.205) 
Observations 1,025 
Note. The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for the regression model outlined in Subsection 3.2. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the observations at the 
participant level. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level. 
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Table 4. 










by other employers 
Interview scale 
A. CANDIDATE CHARACTERISTICS       
Female gender −0.080 (0.074) 0.157*** (0.054) 0.185*** (0.052) 0.142*** (0.053) 0.076 (0.063) 0.040 (0.058) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.018 (0.065) 0.991*** (0.066) 0.233*** (0.054) 0.775*** (0.067) 0.215*** (0.065) 0.038 (0.079) 
Five years’ experience 0.127* (0.066) 0.098** (0.048) 0.070 (0.053) 0.020 (0.053) −0.037 (0.066) 0.174*** (0.067) 
Unemployment duration −0.029*** (0.003) −0.019*** (0.003) −0.019*** (0.003) −0.025*** (0.003) −0.049*** (0.004) −0.023*** (0.004) 
Volunteering 0.268*** (0.066) 0.122*** (0.046) 0.949*** (0.068) 0.152*** (0.052) 0.219*** (0.066) 0.017 (0.063) 
Referral −0.978*** (0.080) −0.161*** (0.050) −0.185*** (0.052) −0.262*** (0.055) −0.084 (0.070) −0.090 (0.076) 
B. PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS       
Female gender −0.014 (0.106) 0.082 (0.101) 0.058 (0.077) 0.080 (0.107) −0.115 (0.138) 0.344** (0.141) 
Age 0.012* (0.007) 0.001 (0.005) −0.001 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006) 0.015* (0.008) 0.018** (0.007) 
Highest obtained educational certification       
    Secondary education or lower −0.161 (0.219) 0.173 (0.147) 0.191 (0.137) 0.063 (0.180) 0.184 (0.204) −0.019 (0.252) 
    Tertiary education: outside university −0.158 (0.103) 0.008 (0.104) −0.042 (0.078) 0.095 (0.100) 0.288** (0.127) 0.107 (0.122) 
    Tertiary education: university (reference)       
Frequency of hiring: weekly −0.123 (0.119) −0.278*** (0.103) −0.181** (0.091) −0.119 (0.106) −0.146 (0.153) −0.210 (0.143) 
Experience as HR professional: ≥ 10 years −0.086 (0.134) 0.039 (0.117) −0.057 (0.093) 0.020 (0.118) −0.075 (0.164) −0.182 (0.148) 
C. PERCEIVED CANDIDATE TRAITS       
Perceived motivation      0.503*** (0.046) 
Perceived intellectual abilities      0.259*** (0.063) 
Perceived social abilities      0.144** (0.056) 
Perceived trainability      −0.045 (0.063) 
Perceived evaluation by other employers      0.192*** (0.042) 
Observations 1,025 
Note. The presented statistics are coefficient estimates and standard errors in parentheses for the mediation model outlined in Subsection 3.3. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of the 
observations at the participant level. *** (**) ((*)) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) ((10%)) significance level.  
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ENDNOTES 
1 We elaborate on the specifics of this policy and the theoretical channels through which it might affect our experimental outcomes in Subsection 2.1. 
2 Throughout the present article, we assume that employers are aware if a candidate has been referred to a vacancy. As explained in Subsection 2.1, this is a realistic assumption in the case 
of the referral scheme central to our study.  
3 To determine whether or not this is the case, it would be interesting to replicate our study by means of a field experiment, although it would not be straightforward to inform employers on 
the referral status of applicants in a realistic way within such an experiment, and this type of experiment would not provide insight into the specific signals of the scheme. 
4 More concretely, this happens automatically via a software program for employers with a profile in the PES database and manually—but very soon after the matching is done—for employers 
without such a profile.    
5 The information on the referral procedure was given to us by caseworkers of the PES of Flanders. A transcript of this information is available upon request.   
6 As argued in Subsection 2.1, it is highly likely that a Flemish employer is aware that a candidate is referred to a position by the PES so that this is a realistic vignette factor.  
7 Transcripts of these interviews are available upon request. 
8 This design maximises both orthogonality and level balance, thereby enhancing statistical precision (Auspurg & Hinz, 2014). Formally, this approach maximises the D-efficiency, which is given 
by the following formula: 












where 𝑋 is the vector of the vignette variables, 𝑛𝑠 indicates the number of vignettes in the sample and 𝑝 presents the number of regression coefficients (including the intercept) in the analysis of 
the experimental data. For more information, we refer to Auspurg and Hinz (2014). 
9 Liechti et al. (2017) argue that the response rate in this type of experiment is of lesser importance as long as each profile is judged by multiple participants. This is the case here, as each 
profile was judged by an average of 3.417 participants (i.e. 205 [respondents] divided by 60 [sets of profiles]). 
10 The fact that mentioning volunteering activities appears to have a larger effect on one’s hiring chances than having completed a higher education programme or having three years of 
additional work experience might seem surprising. However, this result is in line with what is found by Baert and Vujić (in press), who show by means of a field experiment that job candidates 
mentioning volunteering receive one-third more interview invitations. Moreover, multiple studies have shown that volunteering activities appear to have a positive impact on earnings (Day & 
Devlin, 1997, 1998; Detollenaere et al., 2017; Gozzi et al., 2013; Hackl et al., 2007; Prouteau & Wolff, 2006; Sauer, 2015) and that this volunteer work, when done by ethnic minorities, may even 
cancel out ethnic discrimination in the labour market (Baert & Vujic, 2016). 
11 Indeed, these correlations range from r = 0.135 (between perceived social abilities and perceived evaluation by other employers) to r = 0.632 (between perceived social abilities and 
trainability).  
                                                          
